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TOWARD A REASONABLE ETHICS OF BELIEF 
by 
Frederick Ferre 
Like Or. Blanshard. whose philosophic temper I have admired as long as I ha"e 
read philosophy, J am a partisan of reason in religion -as in all of life. Without the 
controls of some criteria, lile drifts or staggers aimlessly. Without concern for 
consistency and coherence among the aims of life, one's policies of action are likely 
lo defeat one another and even at best will lack integration and the benefits of 
mutual support. Without insistence on adequacy to the many demands of life, 
integration itself may be purchased, by the resolute exclusion of relevant value· 
claims, at the high cost of fanatical narrowness. 
Reason in life, in other words, guards wholeness and fullnes against ad hoc 
randomness, self·sefeat, and one-eyed loss of perspective. Religion, as the domain 
of life's fundamental \Blues. is a fortiori in urgent need of reason at every le\el: 
re�on is needed, that is. not only in analyzing particular a.ssertions and practices as 
to their success in performing their appropriate function within the total scheme, 
but also in as'>essing those propositional networks by which rehgious thinkers at· 
tempt to articulate and relate the beliefs that are implicit within their religion's 
basic "alucs - and is needed even in weighing for wisdom the fundamental value· 
orienting imagery on which religions rest. 
Holding such a position on the pervasive claims of reason in religion, I shaU best 
perform my role as commentator, I think. by attempting simply to focus and refine 
the is.sues that Or. Blanshard has laid out. 
My intention is to remark on five different statements Dr. Blanshard makes on 
what the central issue is. Sometimes, as he puts the question, the answer comes 
easily. But not always. 
For me the eusiesl formulation of the issue is stated in the context of Or. Blan· 
shard's polemic against historical Christianity's allegedly uniform hostility toward 
intellectual responsibility in matters of religious belief. I am going to ignore the 
question of whether this hostility is fully representative of the many-stranded 
history of Christian thought. I doubt it. But St. Paul, Tertullian, Martin Luther, and 
others. all said things amply sufficient to draw Dr. Blanshard's fire: thus if the issue 
is set in their terms my response is obvious. If the issue. as Blanshard phrac;es it, is 
whether or not we should tolerate "a hard requirement that no matter what the 
evidence one might suppose one had, assent must be given lo certain tenets of the 
creed . . .  ," then my answer, like his, must be an unambiguous negative. Such a 
formulation calls for a barbarous self-mutilation of the mind. J share Or. Blan· 
shard's deep moral revulsion from it. The demand for belief no matter what the 
e'idence hac; no more ethical than intellectual justification; on the contrary, its 
ethical defects are equally fatal, and any religion requiring such dehumanization of 
its de\ otees stands condemned on both cou nts. 
The issue is less clear-cut. however, in another passage wherein Or. Blanshard 
phrases his question: "Ought we to believe where we do not see?" On one in-
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terpretation of "not seeing," of course, the image of "blind belief" is  evoked and 
what I have just said against Tertullian's brand of theological obscurantism remains 
pertinenl. Call this the "do not see at all" interpretation, and classify it with the "no 
matter what" view as clearly unacceptable. But this is only one (rather extreme) 
reading o( the question. Another interpretation (equally extreme) might be 
phrased: "Ought we (ever) to believe where we do not see with perfect clarity?" 
Call thiis the "do not see perfectly" interpretation, and it is clear, I think, that the 
subject has been suddenly changed. Between not seeing perfectly and not seeing at 
all are a wide range of possibilities. I may see less well without my eye-glasses than 
wi1h them. but being without them will not prevent me from coping adequately 
with some kinds of activities. How well I need to see depends upon my purposes 
and the circumstances. On a foggy day I shall drive m y  car more slowly and 
doubtless, unless in an extreme emergency, I shall give up hopes of flying my 
airplane nt all. The crucial questions are, however: how great the restrictions on the 
visibility and how larg,e the risk that is warranted by my purposes. If I were trapped 
in 1he center of a rapidly closing forest fire with my airplane, and if my only chance 
of survival lay in taking off into conditions I would normally avoid, I suspecL that 
even quite low visibilities would seem a blessing. 
But this is all a metaphor. Its epistemological application would seem to be that 
belief without any appropriate warrant, on the one hand, and belief with perfect 
certainty (which presumably occurs only in connection with self-evident or logically 
necessary truths), on the other band, are far from exhausting the relevant alter­
naLives. Our normal s�tuation, I suggest, is somewhere between these extremes. We 
have some grounds, but far from enough for complete certainty, for most of our 
beliefs; and the questlon of whether it is reasonable for us to believe or not under 
those conditions depends upon our circumstances: including the accuracy of our 
assessment of the risks in being wrong and the rewards of being right. "Ought we to 
believe where we do not see?" My answer is: "It all depends." It depends on how 
imperfect our vision is, how urgent the need for decision, what sorts of things need 
LO be "seen" under the circumstances. In all of this, of course. I am including not 
merely religious belief but any sort of beliefs. I am, in brief, calling for a richer 
notion of "reasonableness" than Dr. Blanshard has yet given us for weighing the 
merits of affirming or withholding assent. 
A third formulation of the issue before us is proposed by Dr. Blanshard in a way 
that might lead to just such an enriched notion if pursued. He contrasts withholding 
belief till the evidence warrants with: "the embracing of belief, whether intelligence 
is satisfied or not." The question is well rabsed: Just what "satisfies intelligence"? 
Musi intelligence be fully satisfied prior to the adoption of any belief under any 
circumstances? Whose intelligence, by the way, are we discussing? My com­
mentator's function does not allow me to explore the answers here at any length, 
bu1 just as I am confident that reasonableness does depend upon satisfaction of 
intelligence, so also I suspect that intellectual satisfaction is not irrelevant to 
persons. times. and places. We all know that this is the case actually, inasmuch as 
different intellects are in fact differently satisfied. And even ideally, it would at the 
very least be extremely difficult to specify an absolute standard of intellectual 
satisfaction - one that demonstrably has and continues to have the power to 
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con\incc every intellect exposed to ic of its satisfacttory character. The most I look 
for, therefore, are general crileria of good thinking set within a larger context of 
values and purposes. But this should be enough for finite human thinkers. This 
mt:ans ihat various intelligences may be legitimately satisfied without agreement 
with each other. IL funher means that the genuine hunger many men feel for in­
tellectual satisfaction is set within a multiplicity of basic human hungers. also 
genuine and deserving, that may sometimes be in competition with one another. 
Seen in this light. it is at least possible that, under some circumstances. other in­
terests than intellectual ones should reasonably be served along with intellectual 
interests and even before the intellect is completely satiated in its demands (if 
satiation is possible even in principle, which might well be debated). lf persons 
were exclusively intellects, disembodied and eternal, no other satisfactions would 
count. But since this is not the case, it may be unreasonable, in the fullest sense, to 
def er feeding all other hungers until the intelligence is gorged. 
I I  
Thus far I have been pressing toward an enriched conception of "the reasonable" 
as it pertains to the giving or withholding of assent by living human agents. Another 
skein of questions is brought to the fore by Dr. Blansbard in a fourth statement of 
the issue: "Is i t  true that even in religion," he asks, "beliefs should be accepted only 
on logically relevant evidence?" Here the main concepts that may require some 
enlargement are "logical rele\•ance." "evidence ," and "religious belief" itself. 
Whal is it to be "logically relevant" to some possible belief? Is there some ab· 
solute tandard of logical relevance for all types of belief and all domains of 
thought? Is one and only one kind of evidence designated by the modifie r 
"logically relevant," or is it a normative relationship that Dr. Blanshard has in 
mind? Assuming the latter in view of the endJess variety of the S11Jbject matter of 
human beliefs. what sort of relationship constitutes logical relevance? Or. Blan­
shard writes in places as though "logical relevance" must in principle always ex­
clude consideration of feeling or of human fulfillment, but surely this cannot be so. 
If J am inclined to believe, for example, that Bach's music is greater than the 
Beatles', a part (though probably not all) of my evidence will have to do with the 
quality of my own - and others' - musical experience, essentially including af­
rective �ts well as cognitive dimensions. Likewise data about human fulfillment or 
frustration cannot withour great loss be ruled logically irrelevant to ethical beliefs. 
Indeed, what counts as logically relevant evidence for beliefs in mathematics, 
physics. or astronomy excludes, for the most part. direct reference to the value­
claims of human life (though even here I would not want to forgec the relevant -
:ind unavoidalble - part played by aesthetic, moral, and religious convictions in 
shaping scientific belief); but as subject matters differ so, I submit, does the 
character of what may be taken as logically relevant. My answer to Dr. Blanshardl's 
question, then, so far is: "Yes, even in religion beliefs should be accepted only on 
logically releV"ant evidence: but we srill must determine what sorts of evidence rhJs 
allows in view of what sorts of belief are included in reli�ious beliefs." 
A detailed analysis of the crucial concept of "evidence" is Car beyond the scope 
of this comment. Let me simply say that while the general function of evidence is co 
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count for or against the reasonableness of giving some degree of assent to a possible 
belief, irs specific nature is field-dependent and thus relative to the logical 
character of the sort of beliels at issue. Evidence is either logically relevant, char is, 
or it is not evidence (within chat field of thought) at all. And what makes some 
datum or other evidence is not some absolute chnracteristic inherent in it but, 
rather. the considered judgment of those who work and think in the field that it 
needs to be taken into account in the weighing of their beliefs. Thus evidence 
becomes evidence I submit, by a kind of ruling made - often not without debate -
by those most intimately concerned. Evidence is granted its evidential status by 
being acknowledged as properly pertinent to the resolution of the issue al hand; it 
is ruled in order by those seized of a question; it is admitted into court, as il were, 
by those most interested in reaching a fair verdict. 
Such a view as I have expressed reminds us to be cautious about challenging the 
logical relevance of whac is taken within some field to be significant evidence for or 
against belief that concern that field. My view raises no absolute prohibition: it is 
always in order {both for "insiders" and "outsiders") to ask that the rules of 
evidence in some domain be explicit and carefully examined. But if those most 
coocerneJ continue to insist on considering as evidence for or against their beliefs 
what seems to others logically irrelevant, it is well to remember that ic is always 
possible for critics to misconstrue what kind of belief is really at issue. U religious 
beliefs are logically more similar to astronomical beliefs than lO moraJ beliefs, for 
example, then surely it is true, as Dr. Blanshard argues, that consideration of 
human fulfillment are logically odd when adduced. Here William James, too, is in 
fuU agreement: ''The future movementS of the stars or the facts of past history are 
determined now once for all." he asserts, "whether I like them or not. They are 
given irrespective of my wishes, and in all th3t concerns truths like these subjective 
preference should have no part; it can only obscure the judgment."1 Granted. Here 
l!\'eryone seems in sweet harmony. But since many thoughtful religious 
believers do persist in point to considerations of human fulfillment - con· 
siderations that would obviously be irrelevant in astronomy - I propose we take 
seriously the possibility that at least some important types of religious beliefs are 
quite unlike the astronomical ones with which Dr. Blanshard appears implicitly to 
compare them. 
Ill 
Finally. I turn to a fifth statement of the issue presented by Dr. Blanshard. He 
says Lhat "while the scientific mind has on the whole. though with many lapses, held 
it " rong to exceed the evidence before it. the religious mind has held that 
there is one great exception. and that in th� exceptional case it is not only a right 
but a duty to give one's belief a freer rein. The question before us is whether this is 
true." 
My main concern, having already touched on the need for an enlarged concept 
of reasonableness in risking assent. a more flexible concept of evidence, and a 
reYised analysis of religious belief, is now with the ethical notion of "rights and 
duties." particularly within the domain of religious belief. Religious beliefs, in my 
"iew, as I have hinted, form a complex fabric whose threads are of many quite 
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different kinds.. There are doubtless some beliefs which function ve•ry much like the 
beliefs of his1orians (or as1ronomers), but I rake these to be quite subsidiary to the 
fundamenial function of primary religious beliefs which serve not mainly to 
describe finite states of affairs but to organize, elicit. and express ultimate values. 
My role is not to expound on this view. Rather, entertaining it as a mere 
hypothesis. 1 am curious to see its implicatjons for the question whether there are 
ethical grounds for giving "freer rein" to the religious beliefs we adopt than could 
be appropriate in the sciences or in other primarily descriptive discourse. The out· 
come, I think, tends to confirm the intuition of what Dr. Blanshard calls the 
''religious mind" that there are significant points of difference in both rights and 
duties. 
The "right" to give freer rein 10 religious than to scientific beliefs is derived from 
the different functions played by the rwo. The scientist, through bis enterprise, has 
taken on an obligation to describe finite fact as it is with the utmost dependability. 
In reality he does much more, and it is not my intention to reduce the nature of 
scientific thinking to sheer descriptive accuracy; that, however, is another story for 
another day. What is important. howe�ver, is that rights and obligations in thinking 
be seen as relati\'e to purposes and values in file. One of the 111ain purposes of 
empirical science is dependable reporting: thus oae of the key values of this en· 
terprise is precision in statement coupled with bumble subservience to the actual. 
The religiou thinker, by contrast, is part of a different enterprise , is consequently 
under a different set of obligations, and is thereby in a context of different iights. ln 
affirming a religious belief be is not (on my hypothesis} necessarily attempting to 
report accurately on the actual; he may well be celebrating his intuition of tlhe 
ideal. Hi:> central purpose is to maintain and increase consciousness of the most 
intensely worthy and most extensively relevant object of worship of which he is 
aware; thus one of the key obligations of this enterprise is the avoidance of 
hypocrisy in speech. coupled with humble self-scrutiny against idolatry in ideals. In 
saying this l am not intending to suggest that the religious believer has absolutely 
free rein (values arc not irrelevant to what is the case and vice versa), nor am I 
atlempling io reduce religious thinking to sheer prescriptive expression. Such 
additional complexities would have to be supplied in a fuller account.2 My quick 
sketch here is merely lo suggest a basis for an affirmative reply lo Dr. Blanshard's 
question whet her the ''religious mind" has a right, somehow, to a freer rein (not a 
totally absent rein) in affirming a religion's most crucial beliefs. If those beliefs 
ct:nlrally deal with what is most worthy of worship rather than (in the first instance) 
with what is most probably actual. then rhey should be allowed that right. 
What. though, or the •\Juty" to gi'e freer rein to religious beliefs than scientific 
ones'! 1 agn:e with William James that the purely defensj\'e posture in life - the 
a11empt to avoid all risks by refusing all uocerlainries - is both impossible and, 
when attempted, self-defeating. We are obliged by the facts of finite life to risk. 
whether we like it or not (or acknowledge it or not); the refusal 10 make a positive 
choice is to make a negative one. Thus if (as on my hypot hesis) religious beliefs 
primanly have to do with value-commitments rather than matters of cool, objective 
fact, there wi ll be no avoiding religious beliefs - implicit in our ways of living. at 
lea.c;t. even if never uttered or examined. 
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Thus the question of a "duty" to religious belief has two facets. In one sense, 
since there is no avoiding living so as to exempliiy some values or other, we are 
obliged - but not in any moral sense - to give freer rein to religious belief. We 
literally cannot suspend judgment, while going on Ihfog. on all matters of relevance 
to religion. But in this sense we have no "duty" to implicit religious belief of some 
kind since we cannot help ourselves and "ought" implies the possibility of doing 
otherwise. 
There is another side to the question, however, on which it makes good ethical 
sense to speak of a "duty" to give freer rein to religious belief: this is tbe duty to 
articulate, openly affirm and thereby make available for examination the fun­
damental value structures of one's life. Whence comes this duty? Is it externally 
imposed by philosophers of religion to enhance their prestige or their market 
value? No, if there is a duty to be self-conscious and reflective about one's func­
tioning religious beliefs, it arises from a common human duty to our own reason. 
We are agents, that is true; we are lovers, haters, builders, destroyers, artists, poets 
- people who feel and fear and need and all the rest. But we do think, if we are 
men; we are rational agents, intelligent organisms, and we diminish ourselves if we 
fail lo use our frail powers of reflection to their best advantage in all aspects of our 
lives. Most profoundly of all, then, we have a duty to make explicit and to examine 
that valuational core from which our policies, our sense of self, our vision of the 
meaning of our world extend. We may shirk our obligation to reason in religious 
belief; but if we do, the sanctions fall upon ourselves as well as others. As I said at 
the start, practical unreason - the neglect of consistency, coherence, and 
adequacy as criteria in weighing the wisdom of one's policies of life - invites 
randomness, self-defeat, and one-eyed loss of perspective. The duty to explicit and 
examined religious belief is the duty we aJJ share to enhance intelligence in human 
existence. This duty to be reasonable, in turn, is ultimately grounded in the ideal of 
a full and integrated life. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. William James. "Ttie Sentimenl of Rationality," ESSAYS I N  PRAGMATISM. edited by Albury Castell, 
New York: Hainer, 1957, p. 27. 
2 Sec. for such an account. my BASIC MODERN PHI LOSOPHY OF RELIGION, New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1967, especially Parts t and tt I .  
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